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chainsafe-bls/test/unit/index.test.ts

237 lines
8.8 KiB
TypeScript

import {expect} from "chai";
import {Buffer} from "buffer";
import {IBls, PointFormat} from "../../src/types.js";
import {getN, randomMessage} from "../util.js";
import {hexToBytes} from "../../src/helpers/index.js";
import {maliciousVerifyMultipleSignaturesData} from "../data/malicious-signature-test-data.js";
export function runIndexTests(bls: IBls): void {
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/explicit-function-return-type
function getRandomData() {
const sk = bls.SecretKey.fromKeygen();
const pk = sk.toPublicKey();
const msg = randomMessage();
const sig = sk.sign(msg);
return {sk, pk, msg, sig};
}
describe("signature", () => {
it("should fail loading an invalid signature point (not in G2)", () => {
/* eslint-disable max-len */
const POINT_NOT_IN_G2 = Buffer.from(
"8123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef",
"hex"
);
let sig;
try {
sig = bls.Signature.fromBytes(POINT_NOT_IN_G2, undefined, true);
} catch {
/* eslint-disable no-empty */
}
expect(sig === undefined).equals(true);
});
});
describe("verify", () => {
it("should verify signature", () => {
const {pk, msg, sig} = getRandomData();
const pkHex = pk.toHex();
const isValid = bls.verify(pk.toBytes(), msg, sig.toBytes());
expect(isValid, "fail verify").equals(true);
// Make sure to not modify original pubkey when verifying
expect(pk.toHex()).equals(pkHex, "pubkey modified when verifying");
});
it("should fail verify empty signature", () => {
const {pk, msg} = getRandomData();
const emptySig = Buffer.alloc(96);
const isValid = bls.verify(pk.toBytes(), msg, emptySig);
expect(isValid).equals(false);
});
it("should fail verify signature of different message", () => {
const {pk, sig} = getRandomData();
const msg2 = randomMessage();
const isValid = bls.verify(pk.toBytes(), msg2, sig.toBytes());
expect(isValid).equals(false);
});
it("should fail verify signature signed by different key", () => {
const {msg, sig} = getRandomData();
const {pk: pk2} = getRandomData();
const isValid = bls.verify(pk2.toBytes(), msg, sig.toBytes());
expect(isValid).equals(false);
});
it("should fail verify empty message", () => {
const emptyMsg = new Uint8Array(0);
const {pk, sig} = getRandomData();
const isValid = sig.verify(pk, emptyMsg);
expect(isValid).equals(false);
});
});
describe("verify multiple", () => {
it("should verify aggregated signatures", () => {
const sks = getN(4, () => bls.SecretKey.fromKeygen());
const msgs = getN(2, () => randomMessage());
const pks = sks.map((sk) => sk.toPublicKey());
const sigs = [sks[0].sign(msgs[0]), sks[1].sign(msgs[0]), sks[2].sign(msgs[1]), sks[3].sign(msgs[1])];
const aggPubkeys = [
bls.aggregatePublicKeys([pks[0], pks[1]].map((pk) => pk.toBytes())),
bls.aggregatePublicKeys([pks[2], pks[3]].map((pk) => pk.toBytes())),
];
const aggSig = bls.aggregateSignatures(sigs.map((sig) => sig.toBytes()));
expect(bls.verifyMultiple(aggPubkeys, msgs, aggSig), "should be valid").equals(true);
expect(bls.verifyMultiple(aggPubkeys.reverse(), msgs, aggSig), "should fail - swaped pubkeys").equals(false);
});
it("should verify aggregated signatures - same message", () => {
const n = 4;
const msg = randomMessage();
const sks = getN(n, () => bls.SecretKey.fromKeygen());
const pks = sks.map((sk) => sk.toPublicKey());
const sigs = sks.map((sk) => sk.sign(msg));
const aggregateSignature = bls.aggregateSignatures(sigs.map((sig) => sig.toBytes()));
const isValid = bls.verifyMultiple(
pks.map((pk) => pk.toBytes()),
getN(4, () => msg), // Same message n times
aggregateSignature
);
expect(isValid).equals(true);
});
it("should fail to verify aggregated signatures - no public keys", () => {
const sig = Buffer.alloc(96);
const msg1 = randomMessage();
const msg2 = randomMessage();
const isValid = bls.verifyMultiple([], [msg2, msg1], sig);
expect(isValid).equals(false);
});
it("should fail verify empty message", () => {
const sks = getN(2, () => bls.SecretKey.fromKeygen());
const msgs = getN(2, () => randomMessage());
const pks = sks.map((sk) => sk.toPublicKey());
const sigs = [sks[0].sign(msgs[0]), sks[1].sign(msgs[1])];
const aggSig = bls.Signature.aggregate(sigs);
const emptyMsgs = msgs.map(() => new Uint8Array(0));
const isValid = aggSig.verifyMultiple(pks, emptyMsgs);
expect(isValid).equals(false);
});
});
describe("verifyMultipleSignatures", () => {
it("Should verify multiple signatures", () => {
const n = 4;
const sets = getN(n, () => {
const sk = bls.SecretKey.fromKeygen();
const publicKey = sk.toPublicKey();
const message = randomMessage();
const signature = sk.sign(message);
return {publicKey, message, signature};
});
expect(bls.Signature.verifyMultipleSignatures(sets)).to.equal(true, "class interface failed");
expect(
bls.verifyMultipleSignatures(
sets.map((s) => ({
publicKey: s.publicKey.toBytes(),
message: s.message,
signature: s.signature.toBytes(),
}))
)
).to.equal(true, "functional (bytes serialized) interface failed");
});
it("Test fails correctly against a malicous signature", async () => {
const pks = maliciousVerifyMultipleSignaturesData.pks.map((pk) => bls.PublicKey.fromHex(pk));
const msgs = maliciousVerifyMultipleSignaturesData.msgs.map(hexToBytes);
const sigs = maliciousVerifyMultipleSignaturesData.sigs.map((sig) => bls.Signature.fromHex(sig));
maliciousVerifyMultipleSignaturesData.manipulated.forEach((isManipulated, i) => {
expect(sigs[i].verify(pks[i], msgs[i])).to.equal(
!isManipulated,
isManipulated ? "Manipulated signature should not verify" : "Ok signature should verify"
);
});
// This method (AggregateVerify in BLS spec lingo) should verify
const dangerousAggSig = bls.Signature.aggregate(sigs);
expect(dangerousAggSig.verifyMultiple(pks, msgs)).to.equal(
true,
"Malicious signature should be validated with bls.verifyMultiple"
);
const maliciousSets = pks.map((_, i) => ({
publicKey: pks[i],
message: msgs[i],
signature: sigs[i],
}));
// This method is expected to catch the malicious signature and not verify
expect(bls.Signature.verifyMultipleSignatures(maliciousSets)).to.equal(
false,
"Malicous signature should not validate with bls.verifyMultipleSignatures"
);
});
it("should fail verify empty message", () => {
const n = 4;
const sets = getN(n, () => {
const sk = bls.SecretKey.fromKeygen();
const publicKey = sk.toPublicKey();
const message = randomMessage();
const signature = sk.sign(message);
return {publicKey, message, signature};
});
const setsWithEmptyMsgs = sets.map((set) => ({...set, message: new Uint8Array(0)}));
const isValid = bls.Signature.verifyMultipleSignatures(setsWithEmptyMsgs);
expect(isValid).equals(false);
});
});
describe("serialize deserialize", () => {
/* eslint-disable max-len */
const skHex = "0x0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101";
const pkHexCompExpected =
"0xaa1a1c26055a329817a5759d877a2795f9499b97d6056edde0eea39512f24e8bc874b4471f0501127abb1ea0d9f68ac1";
const pkHexUncompExpected =
"0x0a1a1c26055a329817a5759d877a2795f9499b97d6056edde0eea39512f24e8bc874b4471f0501127abb1ea0d9f68ac111392125a1c3750363c2c97d9650fb78696e6428db8ff9efaf0471cbfd20324916ab545746db83756d335e92f9e8c8b8";
it("Should serialize comp pubkey", () => {
const sk = bls.SecretKey.fromBytes(hexToBytes(skHex));
const pkHexComp = sk.toPublicKey().toHex(PointFormat.compressed);
expect(pkHexComp).to.equal(pkHexCompExpected, "Wrong pkHexComp");
});
it("Should serialize uncomp pubkey", () => {
const sk = bls.SecretKey.fromBytes(hexToBytes(skHex));
const pkHexUncomp = sk.toPublicKey().toHex(PointFormat.uncompressed);
expect(pkHexUncomp).to.equal(pkHexUncompExpected, "Wrong pkHexUncomp");
});
it("Should deserialize comp pubkey", () => {
bls.PublicKey.fromHex(pkHexCompExpected);
});
it("Should deserialize uncomp pubkey", () => {
bls.PublicKey.fromHex(pkHexUncompExpected);
});
});
}